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 There is a commonly held narrative about constitutional 
forms in the Western po liti cal and philosophical tra­
dition. The story is schematically as follows: Initially 
Aristotle and other ancient phi los o phers, including, in­
fluentially, Polybius, propounded the theory of the three 
constitutional forms— monarchy, aristocracy, and de­
mocracy. This model assumes a revolution or circularity 
between the three forms.1  Later, around the seventeenth 
 century, a radical transformation occurs, and po liti cal 
repre sen ta tion assumes center stage. In the contractarian 
tradition, the constitution is defined by how constituted 
power represents the  people. This story, further, unfolds 
as a kind of narrative of pro gress or Bildungsroman. 
Repre sen ta tion ultimately— and this may be understood 
genet ically or historically— leads to forms of representative 
democracy characterized by a strong link between 
constitutional and state forms. Thus, famously, Hegel 
P R E A M B L E :  T H E  R U S E  
O F  S O V E R E I G N T Y  O R  
AG O N I S T I C  M O N I S M ?
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argues in the introduction to his lectures on world his­
tory for the operation of reason in history, which ulti­
mately amounts to an argument about pro gress, whereby 
 there is only one state that encapsulates rationality at each 
historical era.2
This narrative is still prevalent— even pervasive— 
today in the form of the assumption that liberal democ­
racy is the best or most desirable constitutional form. 
Even if this narrative is rarely explic itly stated, and then 
only to be quickly acknowledged as remaining incom­
plete or inadequate— I am thinking  here of books such 
as Fukuyama’s The End of History— the narrative re­
mains largely unchallenged. Even Marxist thought, 
which identifies class strug gle as the motor of historical 
development, rarely contests the historical “fact” of the 
triumph of representative forms of liberal demo cratic 
governance. Fi nally— and this is the most impor tant 
point— this narrative identifies liberal democracy as the 
utmost perfected form (to date) of sovereignty. Or, to 
put it the other way around, in the prevalent narrative 
about constitutional forms, sovereignty is reminiscent 
of what R. G. Collingwood calls an “absolute presuppo­
sition.”3 Sovereignty is the unquestioned and unques­
tionable premise assumed in the narrative that regards 
liberal democracy as the most perfect constitutional 
form. Tacitly, sovereignty is taken as omnipotent.
Is it pos si ble to provide an alternative story, one that 
is, if not untold, at least rarely harkened? I am thinking 
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 here of the story according to which democracy is the 
primary constitution and, consequently, that all other 
constitutional formations are nothing but subversions of 
democracy. As Eric Nelson has shown, this argument 
against the cyclical change between the constitutions 
and for the primacy of democracy— which Nelson refers 
to as “republican exclusivism”— emerges in the seven­
teenth  century as a result of the renewed interest in the 
Hebrew republic.4 I am making the additional point that 
this rejection of the circulation of constitutions may 
lead  either to the cele bration of sovereignty and liberal 
democracy— which is the position Nelson takes—or to 
a radical demo cratic politics.5 This is the politics that I 
want to describe in terms of agonism.
Such an agonistic democracy is not understood  here 
as a constitutional form but rather as the form of the 
constitution. This story emerges in Spinoza’s Theologi-
cal Po liti cal Treatise as well as his Po liti cal Treatise and 
then in Marx’s notes on Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. 
According to this narrative, democracy is counter­
posed to sovereignty— that is, it does not presuppose 
sovereignty but is in fact presupposed by sovereignty. 
As I have argued in Sovereignty and Its Other, this al­
ternative narrative can come to the fore only if we think 
of democracy in agonistic terms, that is, as being in­
volved in a strug gle with sovereignty.6 In this, I have 
been following Derrida and Negri, who—in dif er ent 
ways— draw a distinction between democracy and 
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sovereignty. What I want to add  here is that this ago­
nism is monist. By monism I understand both the onto­
logical condition that existence is never isolated but is 
always a “being with” and the po liti cal insight that 
 there is only ever one constitution, democracy, and that 
all other constitutions are efects of democracy.
I  will develop this position in the form of nine  Theses. 
This form of pre sen ta tion inevitably results in elliptical 
arguments, but the upside is a more synoptic perspec­
tive, which is my aim. Further, I  will show how stasis 
plays a crucial role in the narrative that identifies de­
mocracy as the form of the constitution.  There are 
multiple reasons for this, not least of all that the term 
“constitution” is in fact the Latin translation of stasis in 
forensic rhe toric. But more on stasis in due course.
We first need to frame the prob lem of the two dif er ent 
narratives about the constitution with more clarity, in 
par tic u lar through what I called the absolute presuppo­
sition of the predominant narrative, namely, sovereignty. 
Presupposing sovereignty as the necessary condition 
for constitutional forms essentially raises the question 
 whether it is pos si ble to conceive of a space separate from 
or not consumed by sovereignty.
This question would be trivial if sovereignty is under­
stood simply as the sovereignty of specific states. The 
question is pertinent when we consider the vio lence 
functioning as the structural princi ple of sovereignty. 
Sovereignty can only persist and the state that it sup­
ports can only ever reproduce its structures— political, 
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economic,  legal, and so on— through recourse to certain 
forms of vio lence. Such vio lence is at its most efective 
the less vis i ble and hence the less bloody it is. This in­
sight has been developed brilliantly by thinkers such 
as Gramsci,  under the rubric of hegemony; Althusser, 
through the concept of ideology; and Foucault, as the 
notion of power. It is in this context that we should also 
consider Carl Schmitt’s definition of the po liti cal as the 
identification of the  enemy. They all agree on the essen­
tial or structural vio lence defining sovereignty— their 
divergent accounts of that vio lence notwithstanding.
The prob lem of a space outside sovereignty is com­
plicated when viewed with this structural vio lence in 
mind. The effect of this structural vio lence—in the wide 
variety of forms in which it can be expressed, given spe­
cific historicopo liti cal conditions—is that it proliferates 
exclusions.  These can be the excluded within a social 
formation, such as the poor or minorities, or it can be 
 those excluded from the state externally, such as foreign­
ers, immigrants, and refugees. The excluded can also be 
thoughts or ideas, opinions or cultural practices, that do 
not conform to the mechanism of reproduction used by 
sovereignty. In fact, both of the exclusions— “personal” 
and “impersonal,” for want of better terms— are inter­
connected. For instance, the wide variety of racisms is 
always physical and conceptual. Thus, Gil Anidjar has 
shown in his remarkable Blood how blood is never only 
physical but also partakes of ideas through the “rhe toric 
of sanguification”— a move that allows him to show how 
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blood is indelibly linked to the history and politics of 
Chris tian ity.7 Or— preempting an example that I  will 
deal with  later— justifying vio lence against refugees 
contributes to the affirmation of sovereign power. Exclu­
sions are the phenomenal efects of a structural vio­
lence, and si mul ta neously they sustain and promote 
sovereignty by contributing to its ideological matrix. 
Exclusion both produces and is produced by structural 
vio lence. Thus, the operation of exclusion is the crucial 
mechanism for sovereignty’s structural vio lence.
Posing the question of an outside to sovereignty 
within the context of the mechanism of exclusion turns 
the spotlight to what I call the ruse of sovereignty. This 
essentially consists in the paradox that the assertion of 
a space outside sovereignty is nothing other than the as­
sertion of an excluded space and consequently signals 
the mobilization of the logic of sovereignty.
Let me provide  here just one example of the ruse of 
sovereignty from Carl Schmitt’s Concept of the Po liti cal. 
It comes  after the definition of the po liti cal as the iden­
tification of the  enemy, or as the one who is excluded 
through violent means from the polity. In the course of 
discussing several objections to this idea, in his charac­
teristic irony Schmitt entertains the possibility of a 
staunch pacifism fiercely committed to end vio lence. To 
be consistent with its princi ples, such a pacifist attitude 
should be prepared to wage war to end enmity, or, in 
Schmitt’s words, it should be prepared to conduct “the 
absolute last war of humanity.” The result  will be two­
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fold. Schmitt speculates that such a war “is necessarily 
unusually intense and inhuman  because, by transcend­
ing the limits of the po liti cal framework, it si mul ta­
neously degrades the  enemy.” (In Theory of the Partisan 
this conception  will be designated as absolute enmity.) 
More importantly, such a pacifist politics  will still not 
escape the logic of sovereignty:
If pacifist hostility  toward war  were so strong as to 
drive pacifists into a war against nonpacifists, in a 
war against war, that would prove that pacifism truly 
possesses po liti cal energy  because it is sufficiently 
strong to group men according to friend and  enemy. If, 
in fact, the  will to abolish war is so strong that it no 
longer shuns war, then it has become a po liti cal mo­
tive, i.e., it affirms, even if only as an extreme possi­
bility, war and even the reason for war.8
The war to end all wars is still po liti cal in Schmitt’s sense 
to the extent that an  enemy is identified— the  enemy is 
the  enemy. And the one who decides on the exceptional 
circumstance so as to identify the  enemy is the sover­
eign. To put this in the vocabulary used  here, the at-
tempt to exclude exclusion is itself exclusory and thus 
reproduces the logic of exclusion.
The belief in the exclusion of sovereignty from the 
po liti cal is simply an illusion that we have stepped out­
side its structural vio lence using the very mechanism of 
exclusion that creates and promulgates that vio lence. 
The ruse of sovereignty is that sovereignty’s rejection is 
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tinkering at the edges of already established forms of lib­
eral democracy. It is  either a self­ indulgent lament about 
forms of victimhood or a belligerent pursuit of identity 
politics— such as new rights for minorities— but without 
considering that such a strategy is only pos si ble on pre­
supposing and thus reproducing the status quo. Conse­
quently, confining the efects of structural vio lence to a 
logic of victimhood perpetuates the ruse of sovereignty.
Let me try to formulate the ruse of sovereignty in one 
more way and to provide one more example. The notion 
that  there is an “outside” to sovereignty and the exclusions 
through which sovereignty’s structural vio lence operates 
mirror each other, relying on the same mechanism of ex­
clusion. A good example of this is the stock standard re­
sponse of liberal demo cratic politicians when faced with 
protests: “ Isn’t democracy  great! Without democracy such 
protest would have been impossible.” In other words, the 
challenge to sovereign power is reversed as an affirmation 
of sovereign power. The ruse of sovereignty consists in 
posing a dilemma:  Either  there is something outside sov­
ereignty, or sovereignty is omnipotent. The ruse resolves 
this dilemma in such a way that  either option leads es­
sentially to the same result, namely, to taking sovereignty 
as an absolute presupposition. From the perspective of 
politics,  there is nothing outside sovereignty.
What I call “agonistic monism” is an attempt to ad­
dress the ruse of sovereignty. The idea that democracy is 
agonistically related to sovereignty is fundamental to 
agonistic monism. I take this to mean that a relation 
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nothing but the subjective reanimation of the mecha­
nism of exclusion, with the result that sovereignty is in­
scribed in a new context proliferating in defi nitely. Thus 
the ruse of sovereignty mirrors Hegel’s conception of the 
cunning of reason. As Hegel holds, reason operates and 
determines even that phenomenal realm that seems di­
vorced from it. Or, diferently put, the universal arises 
out of particularity.9 Similarly, the ruse of sovereignty 
pres ents sovereignty as operative in that which is opposed 
to it precisely  because such an opposition presupposes 
the conceptual framework defining sovereignty.
One way in which the ruse of sovereignty operates is 
by confining the efects of structural vio lence to a logic 
of victimhood.  Those who are afected by such vio lence 
seem to have two options— either the revolutionary op­
tion to use vio lence to  counter the vio lence exercised on 
them or the reformist option to try to change the system 
from within. According to the first alternative,  there  will 
always be victims whose only possibility for redemption, 
according to this logic,  will be a kind of apocalyptic 
moment— the end of capitalism, the complete annihila­
tion of the one designated as the  enemy, or the “end to 
the civil war that divides the  peoples and the cities of the 
earth.”10 Such a logic quickly reaches Arendt’s melan­
cholic insight that “all revolutions since the French have 
gone wrong, ending in  either restoration or tyranny.”11 
According to the second alternative, the best that can be 
hoped for in practical or pragmatic terms is  either an 
endless critique without any “normative” purchase or a 
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persists between democracy and sovereignty:  There is no 
pure outside sovereignty.12 In other words, the correct 
question is not about what is excluded from sovereignty 
but rather the manner in which democracy is related to 
sovereignty— democracy and sovereignty are distinct 
but not separate; that is, they do not exclude each other. 
The mechanism of exclusion presupposes the agonal re­
lation between democracy and sovereignty. At the same 
time, this agonistic relation is a monist relation in the 
sense that what cannot be accommodated within sov­
ereignty is also the condition of its possibility. The op­
posite of exclusion is not inclusion—as Agamben, for 
instance, thinks—as this plays right into the hands of 
the ruse of sovereignty. Rather, the opposite of exclusion 
is the being with of democracy, which emerges through 
the agonistic engagement with sovereignty. Sovereign 
vio lence is an efect of its other, where “other” denotes 
both  those who are the target of vio lence and the demo­
cratic disposition that is opposed to sovereignty.
Diferently put, agonistic monism suggests that  there 
is a po liti cal question: Democracy or sovereignty? If the 
answer to the question is  either democracy or sover­
eignty, then sovereignty prevails,  because even if we as­
sert that we are with democracy and that sovereignty is 
our  enemy and needs to be excluded, we are still using 
the logic of exclusion characteristic of sovereignty to 
place democracy outside sovereignty. This is what I call 
the ruse of sovereignty. Conversely, agonistic monism 
asserts that democracy is the cause of sovereignty so that 
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the two are inextricably bound in a relation. The ques­
tion then is no longer about which one is excluded but 
rather about which one is dependent on the other.
Let me describe the same point from a dif er ent per­
spective, without relying so much on the relation be­
tween democracy and sovereignty. If we do not take 
democracy to designate only the regime that gives power 
to the demos—no  matter how the demos is defined, as the 
 people of a national community or as the multitude that 
is incommensurate with any form of repre sen ta tion; if, 
in other words, we do not take the definition of democ­
racy to be exhausted in the opposition of constituent 
and constituted power, then how can we define democ­
racy? Turning to Solon’s first demo cratic constitution, 
I  will suggest in this book that it is pos si ble by identify­
ing the conflictual nature of democracy—or what the 
ancient Greeks called stasis. Agonistic monism holds 
that stasis is the definitional characteristic of democ­
racy and of any other pos si ble constitutional form. Sta­
sis or conflict as the basis of all po liti cal arrangements 
then becomes another way of saying that democracy is 
the form of  every constitution. Hence, stasis comes be-
fore any conception of the state that relies on the ruse of 
sovereignty.
The obvious objection to this position would be about 
the nature of this conflict. Hobbes makes the state of 
nature— which he explic itly identifies with democracy— 
also the precondition of the commonwealth. Schmitt 
defines the po liti cal as the identification of the  enemy. 
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Do not both of them ultimately defend a politics of sover­
eignty as opposed to a demo cratic politics? Foreground­
ing the question of conflict has the  great advantage of 
posing this question, which essentially means that it 
establishes the opposition— that is, the conflict or stasis— 
between democracy and sovereignty. And answering 
this question, as I  will suggest in this book, hinges on 
 whether conflict is liquidated in a higher term or  whether 
conflict can provide an account of stasis as the form of 
the po liti cal.
In order to highlight the contrast between democracy 
and sovereignty, I  will proceed from the ruse of sover­
eignty, since this represents the most cunning form that 
the relation between the two can assume. The ruse of 
sovereignty can take a  great variety of forms, a very 
small number of which I  will describe  here. All  these 
forms are the result of sovereignty’s structural vio lence. 
Such a structural vio lence becomes the alternative to 
stasis or demo cratic conflict. So I  will start by exploring 
this sovereign form of vio lence in the first three  Theses. 
The next three  Theses  will concentrate on the opposition 
of democracy and sovereignty. And in the final three 
 Theses I  will turn explic itly to stasis to highlight its im­
portance for agonistic monism.
